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Since 1945 Germany has been integrating economic migrants 
(from Southern Europe in the 1960s), as well as political ref-
ugees (as a result of the Balkan wars in the 1990s). Never-
theless, immigration policy has been relatively strict. In 2015 
and 2016, there was a temporary policy shift and attracted by 
the German government, around 1.2 million people applied 
for asylum in Germany. These were predominately refugees 
from Syria. The article analyses who represents the interests 
of these refugees and the interests of other migrants in Ger-
many. Since the 1990s, in some German cities they have 
been politically represented by advisory boards for cities. In 
this article, 14 representative cities are analysed and a repre-
sentative sample of citizens and all councillors are interviewed 
in each city. In general, these boards are evaluated positively 
by citizens and by councillors alike, although acceptance is 
slightly lower in Eastern Germany.
Keywords: migration, refugees, integration, Germany, po-
litical representation, deliberative democracy, democratic 
innovation
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1. Introduction 
The year 2015 may be regarded as a watershed in migration policies in 
Germany and most other European countries. Due to the Syrian war, 
political instability in the Near East, and policy change in Germany, the 
push and pull factors for migration were strengthened. On the one hand, 
in all the regions of the Near East, the political and economic crises and 
even war had an important impetus for the push factors for migration. On 
the other hand, the pull factors for migration in form of the political con-
text, and symbolic and immigration policies in European countries and 
especially in Germany became manifest as the reasons for a “big wave” 
of migrants following different routes to Germany and other European 
countries. 
International migration is not solely a European phenomenon and Eu-
rope is not the main and only target region for migrants. South Africa 
has also been confronted with a huge number of international migrants. 
Similarly, in Lebanon, nearly 25 per cent of the population is composed of 
migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries, especially from Syria 
(UNCHR 2017). 
In most of these countries, metropolitan cities have had to accommodate 
many of the migrants because rural areas are less attractive to migrating 
people. Additionally, there is a strong trend towards urbanisation and an 
influx of the local rural population into the cities. As a result, this gener-
ates a high demand for employment, housing, and other social services in 
the cities.
The research question focuses on the social structure and political rep-
resentation of migrants in Germany. Most political refugees have no rep-
resentation in the country they are migrating to. Nevertheless, there may 
be an advocacy interest representation from political representatives with-
in the parliament and at the local level within the council. Furthermore, 
special interest committees, such as advisory boards for migrants, may 
play an important role in the representation of all interest groups relat-
ed to migration. The definition of different subgroups with a migration 
background seems to be crucial. This analysis focuses on the attitudes of 
the German citizenry, as well as of German local politicians, on “advisory 
boards for foreigners”, a democratic innovation which was implemented 
in some provinces (Länder) in the 1990s (Kersting, 2013; 2017). 
In this paper reasons for migration will not be analysed in detail, but will 
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in countries with raging civil wars have led to an enormous movement of 
political refugees (e.g. countries such as Jordan and Turkey have seen vast 
numbers of refugees settle in their refugee camps). In addition, in less au-
thoritarian and semi-democratic regimes, where human rights are partly 
respected, religious and ethnic groups leave their home countries due to 
political reasons (see for example Nigeria). Other important reasons for 
migration, which often overlap, may be found in economic crises, extreme 
poverty, unemployment, and difficulties in meeting basic needs in the 
migrants’ home countries.
In the following section, immigration policies and policies of diversity 
management and affirmative action in Germany will be analysed. Addi-
tionally, this research focuses on the concept of interculturalism in order 
to overcome the negative tendencies of fragmentation and segregation 
and the development of parallel societies in purely multicultural settings.
Following 1945, migration policies in Germany followed a specific adminis-
trative and political culture. Because of German history and the experience 
of the Nazi regime, the German constitution (Grundgesetz) highlights, in 
article 16a, the human right to asylum. During the Nazi regime, thousands 
of political refugees and members of ethnic and religious groups such as 
the Sinti, Roma, and Jews, had to leave their homes and received asylum 
in countries all over the world. For this reason, human rights related to the 
issue of asylum are regarded as very important in Germany and thus legal 
action and proof of the right to asylum and political reasons for migration 
were included in a detailed, long-term judicial investigation.
Nevertheless, since World War II German governments have never re-
garded Germany as an immigration country. This is because there was 
no strong colonial history apart from certain African countries such as 
Namibia or Tanzania, and all these colonies were abandoned in the early 
20th century, during World War I. This implies that when it comes to in-
tegration, language often becomes a burden to immigrants. Following an 
increase in immigration in the 1990s, it was as early as in 1993 that this 
right to political asylum was reduced on the basis of international treaties. 
New immigration policies, such as the Dublin convention, allowed for 
rejections of political asylum and the re-transport of asylum-seekers to 
safe neighbouring countries on the border of the European Union and 
the Schengen Area. This meant that migrants could be sent back to the 
country where they had entered the European Union. In a basically land-
locked country such as Germany there was no direct access from outside 
the European Union. This led to the situation that migrants could only 
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Furthermore, German integration policies were based on old nationalistic 
reasoning. According to German law, people who were born in Germany 
are not automatically granted citizenship. On the other hand, individuals 
who can prove that their ancestors came from Germany can acquire citizen-
ship more easily. This “ius sanguinis” has often been criticised and discussed 
in German politics. With the demographic change and the decline in Ger-
man population, a paradigm and policy shift in migration policy occurred 
and a new migration law was discussed, which would allow foreigners to ac-
quire German citizenship with greater ease. In the early 2000s a green card 
programme was implemented to attract well-educated immigrants, but this 
strategy was not very successful. In 1998 dual citizenship was discussed and 
highly criticised. Later on, however, dual citizenship became partly allowed 
or tolerated in the case of some countries (Kersting, 2008).
Firstly, a brief overview and statistics on migration in Germany will be 
presented. Who has been migrating to Germany since 1945? Secondly, 
based on the theory of migration, a brief description of the social struc-
ture of migrants and migration behaviour, as well as their needs, will be 
provided. What are the main problems of migrants?
In the following section the focus lies on migration policies and the polit-
ical representation of migrants. Here the status quo is analysed in cities 
with more than 50,000 inhabitants. As refugees, they can often rely only 
on a kind of advocative, indirect representation, which may lead to a situa-
tion where even well-minded policies fail to meet their goals. What kind of 
representation is there for groups with different migration backgrounds? 
Here a comparative study of 14 cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants 
will be analysed in depth. These cities differ in terms of region (Eastern 
and Western Germany), size (metropolitan areas and cities), wealth (debt 
rate), social situation (citizen receiving social welfare grants according to 
the law (Sozial-Gesetzbuch, SGB), regulations on introducing advisory 
boards for foreigners, as well as in the number of migrants in each city 
(Kersting, 2016).
In the cities of various German Länder the existing political structures 
and migration policies, as well as the representative bodies within these 
cities, follow varying strategies. With regard to this, the paper presents 
survey data (from 1998) of migrants in German cities and a more detailed 
evaluation of the attitudes held by both citizens and politicians towards 
migrant representational bodies in the form of “advisory boards for for-
eigners” (Ausländerbeiräte, Integrationsräte) in different German cities. 
Existing programmes to integrate migrants into German cities will not 
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in NRW, Ulusoy et al., 2016). It is obvious that in the German federal 
system, with around 10,000 strong multipurpose and multifunctional cit-
ies, coordination in the cities is extremely important and there seems to 
be a need for inter-municipal corporation (Kersting et al., 2009). Here, 
political representation and citizen feedback can be crucial for efficient 
and effective policies. But who represents the refugees and their interests, 
and how is their feedback included? Advisory boards for migrants are re-
garded as important actors in this regard. How are they accepted by the 
citizenry and in the city councils? How are they elected? What are their 
structures and competences? Political reality differs among the various 
German Länder, as it does at the municipal level.
2. Definition of Migrant Population  
and Migration Trends 
Citizens with a migration background or migrants are not a homogeneous 
group, and can be characterised by three main factors. First, migrants 
derive from different countries and have different cultural and religious 
backgrounds, which leads to different needs and expectations. Secondly, 
the length of the migrants’ stay is an important aspect not only in terms of 
economic but also cultural accommodation. Thirdly, from a political point 
of view, their status within the German legal system differs. Here political 
refugees constitute a special group. By definition, these asylum-seekers 
can be divided into informal (illegal) migrants and those who have applied 
for asylum but are still uncertain about their application on the one hand, 
and those who are guaranteed and accepted asylum-seekers on the other. 
In general, the latter group have a three-year right to stay in Germany 
before a new application has to be initiated. 
Migration is not a recent phenomenon. Over the centuries there has been 
large-scale movement between different regions of the world. In Germany 
after World War II, many Germans and refugees from Eastern Europe 
came to German cities and rural areas and had to be accommodated. 
Polish- and German-speaking individuals were able to integrate relative-
ly easily in the post-war period, when political–economic development 
brought a range of employment opportunities, especially in the steel in-
dustry in the Ruhr region. In the subsequent phase of the economic boom 
(1955), workers from Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, and later Turkey) 
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sion of the 1970s. Nevertheless, integration was not easily accomplished 
and especially the Turkish group (with 3 million individuals) developed a 
kind of parallel society. This group consists of the first generation, which 
mostly grew up in the poorer rural areas of their country of origin, and 
nowadays of the second generation, which was fully socialised in the Ger-
man context. 
The third important wave came after the collapse of the divide between 
the Eastern and Western Blocs in 1989 and the disintegration of the 
USSR. Since 1990 the so-called “late immigrants” (Spätaussiedler) have 
been immigrating from the former USSR or Russian republics to Germa-
ny. This group could easily get citizenship in accordance with the legal 
background of “ius sanguinis”.
The breakdown of former Yugoslavia created a new crisis in Eastern Eu-
rope in the 1990s. With the Balkan wars, a large group of refugees came 
to Germany in the mid-1990s. This particular immigration wave was a 
reason for greater xenophobic tendencies, especially in Eastern Germany, 
and triggered new, stricter migration policies. This ended in the Dub-
lin Regulation and a new migration policy (Asylkompromiss) in the 1990s. 
With the end of the Balkan wars, 75 per cent of these refugees went back 
to the new states of Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia (Haug, 2017). 
The enlargement of the European Union led to new forms of economic 
integration, whereby the free movement of people included new opportu-
nities for workers. With the accession of Eastern European countries to 
the European Union, there was an interim phase where work opportuni-
ties and rights were restricted for migrants from these countries. Never-
theless, with the end of this phase a broad group of legal immigrants tried 
to find work opportunities in the richer countries of Western Europe, as 
well as in German cities. 
There is a special form of citizenship granted to immigrants from within 
the European Union. They have special rights and can easily obtain work 
permits. Furthermore, politically these immigrants have full enfranchise-
ment in local elections, as long as they are formally registered.
Migration in 2015–2016 was the heaviest in the new millennium and was 
a reminder of the situation after World War II. Half of the Syrian refugees 
in Europe applied for asylum in Germany in the period 2015–2016. In 
these two years, around 1 million asylum-seekers and migrants arrived 
from Syria, as well as Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries, via the Bal-
kan Route. Some were political refugees according to the Geneva Con-
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talisation of the restrictive Dublin Regulation, as well as a stricter policies 
in Eastern European countries and in Turkey, migration into Germany 
nearly ceased altogether by the end of 2016 (see Graph 1).
Graph 1: Asylum Application 1985–2017 in Germany
Source: Author, based on Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2017, p. 3 (only West 
Germany until 1989).
In some cases, the status was due to a legal process which was very cumber-
some and often took over a year, because it was based on individual con-
texts. In 2016 the list of countries which were regarded as safe countries of 
origin included the Maghreb states, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It is worth 
noting that the status of Afghanistan was changed to unsafe in 2017.
Administrative and registration processes were centralised nationally to a 
certain extent, in coordination with provincial and local administration, 
but they remained very long and cumbersome. Following their entry into 
the country asylum-seekers were forbidden to work, but had to attend 
German language courses and fulfil similar requirements. In 2016 the 
German government forbade family reunification for temporarily accept-
ed Syrian refugees (under subsidiary protection) because another 200,000 
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3. Migration Statistics
Statistics on immigration are problematic. In Germany, all citizens have 
to register according to the law, but there is a large number of informal 
immigrants in the country. It is important to note that Germany – in con-
trast to the US, the UK, and some other countries – has never defined it-
self as a country of immigration. Furthermore, despite central registration 
for citizens, in German federalism the autonomous cities and municipali-
ties actually implement the registration process.
Then the demographic changes and the need for a labour force triggered a 
policy change. As noted before, there were big changes and waves when it 
comes to immigration. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs reported a 
high demand for immigration, and it is here that statistics differ significantly. 
According to the projected demographic change, by 2021 a number of 
300,000 immigrants could stop the decline in labour force. But it has been 
calculated that by 2021 between 100,000 and 200,000 people will migrate 
to Germany. Another report concludes that 270,000 well-trained immi-
grants per annum are needed to meet the demand for workers within the 
German economic system. According to Haug (2017), a net immigration 
of 400,000 and 530,000 people is regarded to be necessary to stabilise the 
German working population. In Germany in 2011, 15.96 million migrants 
accounted for 19.6% of the population, with 6.9 million of these being non-
citizens with migration experience and 6.1 million German citizens with a 
migration background (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012; see Haug, 2017). 
These citizens are predominantly late settlers from the former USSR, who 
were covered by the ius sanguinis regulation (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2015f; Haug, 2017). Another 4.6 million are German citizens without a mi-
gration background, which means these are second-generation immigrants 
or the children of the late settlers (Spätaussiedler). There is also a substantial 
group (1.9 million) of non-citizens without migration experience. These are 
non-citizens who were born and have lived in Germany all their lives. 
Statistics on people with a migration background differ by definition 
(first-generation, second-generation, and so on). The following are statis-
tics on people with a migration background in German cities: Berlin has 
around 18%, Nuremberg 20%, and Essen 15%. Some cities like Münster 
have a migrant population of less than 10%, and in Eastern Germany, the 
number stands around 7% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015).
According to Krummacher (2017), 95% of migrants live in Western Ger-
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migrants live in metropolitan areas, 30% in medium-sized municipalities, 
and 26% in smaller towns (Krummacher, 2017).
Until 1973, a brain drain from the poorer European countries towards 
the rich ones could be clearly observed. In this period of immigration 
Germany had around 500,000 immigrants per year more than emigrants. 
The next wave of immigration started in 1989, with a peak of 1.5 million 
immigrants to Germany in 1992. 
By this time, emigration from Germany had grown to 750,000 and peaked 
in 2013, with nearly 1 million people leaving the country. From 2009 on-
wards, immigration grew again from around 1 million people to 1.5 mil-
lion people in 2014. 
In most years, there was a very small surplus of immigration, but in 2008 
there was a negative balance, with more people leaving Germany than im-
migrating. One reason lies in re-migration, which is often ignored in Ger-
man cities, because citizens do not de-register (see Graph 2). For example, 
first-generation Turkish immigrants, but also those from Mediterranean 
countries, often went back to their home countries after retirement. In Tur-
key, some of them faced problems with reintegration. Since 2006 it has 
been possible to observe this for younger age groups of Turkish immigrants. 
In 2015 statistics showed that circular migration was relatively high regard-
ing the exchange between Poland and Germany (BMI & BAMF, 2015). 
Graph 2: Migrants in German Cities
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In the 1980s the number of asylum applications stood below 100,000 (see 
Graph 1). Beginning in 1985, this number rose to more than 400,000 in 
the early 1990s with the Balkan wars, but it dropped again in 1994 and 
the subsequent years to below 100,000. In the 2000s it stabilised at below 
50,000. 
The number of asylum-seekers (accepted and applying) rose with the cri-
sis and the civil war in Syria, with around 500,000 new applications (see 
Graph 1); hence the number of asylum-seekers has gone up by 150% 
since 2014.
The city statistics for asylum-seekers are quite unreliable1. Administra-
tion staff at all levels face problems with registration, census, and the 
central register. In some “central camps”, for instance in Bavaria, there 
were twice as many people accommodated in 2017 than were identi-
fied as asylum-seekers in the whole of Bavaria. Municipalities such as 
Münster or Duisburg with around 300,000 inhabitants had to accom-
modate around 4,000 refugees.2 Nevertheless, it may be observed that 
in 2017 the number of applications declined sharply to around 100,000 
(see graph 1).
Regarding countries of origin in 2016, around 12,000 asylum-seekers came 
from Syria, around 5,000 from Iraq, and another 2,000 from Iran. The 
distribution of these asylum-seekers followed the Königsteiner-Schlüssel 
(distribution formula). More than 16,000 went to the biggest province of 
North Rhine-Westphalia, which makes up 20% of the German popula-
tion; 6,000 asylum-seekers went to medium-sized Länder, and fewer than 
2,000 to smaller Länder. 
According to Haug (2017), a report on refugees from 2015 showed that 
more than half (55%) were under the age of 25 – mostly male – and more 
than half of these (53%) did not have any education or work experience.
Social groups with a migration background have a higher fertility rate. In 
2014 around 35% of children below five years of age were of a migration 
background. In the 35–44 age group, 25% of the general population has 
a migration background. In bigger cities, this group is represented by a 
1 Cities were not calculating immigration into the cities correctly. This could be ob-
served during the census in 2013, where municipalities had to readjust the population size 
because they had overestimated the number of people with a migration background living 
within the city boundaries.
2 In 2015 and 2016, in addition to this group, in cities like Duisburg another 4,000 
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higher percentage than it is in smaller municipalities and it is predicted 
that this percentage will continue to grow. For example, in the case of 
Bavaria every fifth Bavarian has a migration background and by 2024 this 
will have risen to one quarter of the Bavarian population. It is also obvious 
that the fertility gap is growing.
Although the percentage of migrants with a high education background 
is rising, on average migrants still have a relatively low level of education. 
In addition, in the group of refugees around a third have a university or 
a high-school degree. This is slightly higher in the subgroup consisting of 
refugees from Syria, at around 55% (Haug, 2017). 
Nowadays migration is highly influenced by new information and com-
munication technologies. Individual decisions to migrate and the struc-
tural context of migration come together with broader experiences of mi-
gration, which could be easily transmitted via new digital media. In this 
regard, migration has a self-strengthening effect (Haug, 2017).
In 2015 in Germany, refugees were given free accommodation (in town 
halls, sports arenas, and schools), designated towns, and a small amount 
of money, which covered their basic needs. There was no freedom to set-
tle close to existing social networks or family networks. According to the 
theory of social networks, refugees try to stay together with family mem-
bers or people from the same countries (Haug, 2008).
Following a heated discussion in 2016, the German national government 
changed its migration policy. It forbade family reunification, although this 
is required under international law, so male refugees were often unable to 
bring their families to Germany easily.
In Germany, there are regional disparities when it comes to housing 
and employment. In some cities the housing situation is highly problem-
atic and the cost of living is very high. Nevertheless, these areas enjoy 
the highest rates of employment. In most rural areas the cost of living 
is cheaper but employment opportunities are much less frequent. Nota-
bly, immigration policies have often forced migrants to live in rural areas, 
smaller towns, or villages. 
Due to demographic changes in Germany, some cities and towns are 
shrinking; meanwhile in other areas there is a strong influx of people 
which leads to extremely high rent and accommodation costs (for exam-
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Bonn (NRW) 311.287 12.6 4577 10.6 56.8 X
Essen (NRW) 569.884 11.2 5773 18.5 45.3 X
Marburg (Hessen) 73.125  8.5 1044  7.7 50.7 X
Münster (NRW) 299.708  8 2590  8 59.7 X
Konstanz (Baden-Wuerttemberg) 81.141 12.6 320  4.5 47.5 X
Koblenz (Rhineland-Palatinate) 110.643  9 3792  9.8 47.9 X
Nürnberg (Bavaria) 498.876 17.8 2542 11.6 44.3 0
Heidelberg (Baden-Wuerttemberg) 152.113 17.7 1280  5.3 50.7 X
Freiburg (Baden-Wuerttemberg) 220.286 14.3 809  8.4 51.4 X
Hamburg-Altona (Hamburg) 262.129 29.3 21459 11.1 45.8
Berlin Mitte (Berlin) 351.161 29.4 21839 16.2 50.7
Leipzig (Saxony) 531.562  5.4 1327 16.9 41.8 X
Potsdam (Brandenburg) 161.468  4.6 538 11 48.9 X
Erfurt (Thueringa) 204.880  3.8 782 14.6 47.3 X
Source: Author, based on Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, own data base.
(Bayern, Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen, North Rhine-Westfalia 
(NRW), former West Germany; Brandenburg, Sachsen Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen, Sach-
sen, former East Germany). The city states of Hamburg and Berlin and their submunicipal 
districts have no regulations.
SGB 2: Citizens with welfare grants (Sozialgesetzbuch 2), Foreigner (excluding migrational 
background citizens with German citizenship), Cities debt rate; Voter turnout at local elec-
tion, Obligatory „Advisory Board for Migrants”.
In the cities analysed here it may be observed that there is very large num-
ber of people with a migration background, especially in metropolitan 
areas such as Hamburg and Berlin. These cities have different forms of 
representation when it comes to foreigners. Here, around one third of the 
population has a migration background, not including migrants with Ger-
man citizenship. In most other cities it may be observed that the number 
of migrants is much lower (20%); for instance, in cities such as Münster 
or Koblenz it is below 10%. In general it can be seen that the smaller the 























Kersting, N. (2018). Migration and Integration in German Cities
HKJU-CCPA, 18(2), 201–222
lower overall in Eastern Germany, where less than 6% of the population 
has a migration background.
On the other hand, most of the bigger cities, especially cities like Berlin, 
have a very high debt rate. This reduces the possibilities of developing 
certain policy fields and infrastructure. In general, the debt rate of Ger-
man cities can be very high. Cities in provinces like Bavaria, Baden-Würt-
temberg, and Saxony, have lower debt, while in municipalities in North 
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Rhineland-Palatinate the debt rate is rela-
tively high. The SG2 rate relates to the number of citizens who are under 
different welfare regimes. Social welfare programmes such as the SGB 2 
focus predominantly on long-term unemployed citizens. German cities 
are multifunctional and historically provide services in all these areas.
4. Political Representation
According to the 2004 Charter of the Fundamental Human Rights of the 
European Union, refugees, like all human beings, have the right to politi-
cal representation, which may be direct or indirect. The German Consti-
tution includes the legal framework for representation, as do the regional 
constitutions of the provinces. Furthermore, regulations at local levels are 
formulated in local government acts by the regions and other laws at the 
regional level. At the local level, local charters and bylaws provide a full 
range of representation as an instrument of participation under regional 
local government acts (Kersting, 2008). 
During a local financial crisis of the 1990s and the 2000s, there was a 
reduction of participatory instruments, especially in medium-sized cities. 
There seemed to be less interest in the political representation of foreign-
ers. However, a few cities introduced the integration of an ombudsman, 
officers as well as special units, and local administrations for cultural ques-
tions. Furthermore, civil society organisations such as churches, NGOs, 
and other organisations became important actors in migration policies 
(Krummacher, 2017; Haug, 2017). 
Local government associations in Germany have historically been more 
passive and even defensive on the subject of integration. This engage-
ment and attitude changed slightly at the end of the 1990s (Krummacher, 
2017). The new migration law of 2005 (Zuwanderunsggesetz) reduced the 
possibility of an internal integration policy compared to former legislation 
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In local administration new concepts were developed in Berlin, Munich, 
and other cities. Nevertheless, an integrated regulation of integration pol-
icies as a local function is requested and implemented at the provincial 
level in some Länder (Kersting, 2004; Gesemann & Roth, 2009, 2016; 
Krummacher, 2017, p. 87). In 2015–16 a culture of open arms developed 
in most metropolitan areas, and civil society showed its activism through 
numerous voluntary organisations.
Until 2017 only three regions had had advisory boards to represent the 
rights of migrants. This was first implemented in the state of Hessen (Aus-
länderbeiräte) and in NRW (Integrationsräte), and subsequently in the local 
government act of Baden-Württemberg (see Kersting, 2016). There, advi-
sory boards for foreigners or integration councils have been implemented 
in most cities. Nevertheless, some other bigger cities and municipalities 
in the other provinces also allow the implementation of advisory boards 
for foreigners. In Hesse and NRW, regulations within the Länder consti-
tution and local government acts focus on the size of the cities; so advi-
sory boards for migrants are implemented in cities with more than 5,000 
inhabitants. In some Länder it is an obligation for cities of a certain size, 
whilst in others it is a voluntary initiative (Kersting, 2017).
In Germany, foreigners from European Union countries were allowed to 
vote at local and EU elections because migrants from EU countries are 
full citizens and are allowed to vote. Non-EU citizens are disenfranchised, 
but they are represented on elected advisory boards for foreigners (Hes-
sen) and integration councils (NRW). This enfranchisement includes Eu-
ropean Union citizens, Eastern European citizens, and asylum-seekers. 
Migrants may be actively engaged in voting and run as candidates. In 
most cases members of these advisory boards are directly elected. NRW’s 
integration councils include directly elected migrants and ordinary coun-
cil members. Additionally, in other cities, organised interest groups and 
citizen experts are included. Predominantly, the chair is held by an elect-
ed member of the council, and in some cities the mayor takes over the 
role of chair.
Advisory boards for migrants or integration councils have certain rights as 
do other communities within the local government, including the right to 
be heard at the council and the right to speak and address the council. In 
certain areas they can make proposals, often together with other commit-
tees. They also have their own small budget. Additional rights which have 
been requested are a higher budget and more binding decision rights, as 
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4.1. Empirical data 
Survey research and opinion polls in 2016 showed that advisory boards for 
migrants are highly respected within the citizenry (for details of a survey 
with 2,700 citizens and more than 600 councillors, see Gabriel & Kersting, 
2014). Around 66% of the citizens think that advisory boards for migrants 
are a very important instrument of political participation at the local level.
Graph 3: Citizen Attitudes: Advisory Boards for Migrants in Germany
Source: Author; for further data on empirical research see Kersting (2016); middle group 
not shown.
The analysis shows that these instruments are less attractive in Eastern 
Germany, but they are highly attractive in Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-
Württemberg, and Hesse. A multilevel analysis on advisory boards for 
migrants in Germany shows that they are much more important in West-
ern Germany, especially in cities with a strong Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), where these boards are strongly supported. Other aspects such 
as city size, voter turnout, wealth, the level of other participatory oppor-
tunities, or the status of a diverse university town were not significantly 
relevant factors in the evaluation. 
Among local councillors and administrators, advisory boards for migrants 
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10% of the councillors evaluate the advisory boards as not important at all. 
In the Eastern German city of Erfurt and in Bavarian cities the advisory 
boards achieve better results. In North Rhine-Westphalia councillors are 
more sceptical, although some serve on these boards. Nevertheless, in some 
cities such as Bonn the local councils are divided into two groups, one of 
which rejects the idea and another important group which supports them. 
Graph 4: Councilors’ Attitudes: Advisory Boards for Migrants in Germany
Source: Author; for further data on empirical research see Kersting (2016); middle groups 
not shown.
5. Conclusions
Germany’s population is shrinking and there is a strong demand for im-
migration. Nevertheless, integration is not an easy task, particularly in 
Eastern Germany, where there are fewer immigrants and xenophobia is 
obvious. Therefore, immigration policies have to be administered well. 
Here, federalism and strong local authorities often lack the capacity to 
learn from neighbouring cities, and the federal level fails to learn from the 
experience of the provinces. 
In 2015 civil war in Syria and symbolic policies at the national level in 
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tors struggled with the immense influx of people only to realise that this 
situation might have been handled with the help of civil society. In 2017 
the situation regarding the status of refugees is unclear. Developments 
from August 2015 until the end of 2016 showed strong dedication to the 
rule of law when it comes to the individual rights of refugees on the one 
hand, but on the other hand, they demonstrated a lack of capacity within 
the German bureaucracy. The situation with refugees was mitigated by 
strong civil society engagement and an “open arms” culture with strong 
civic engagement, which made refugees feel welcome. Especially in West-
ern Germany, many NGOs, churches, and other civic groups and organ-
isations assumed many governmental responsibilities and state functions 
regarding the integration of refugees. This crisis was made more acute 
by the financial crisis, as well as a lack of coherent integration concepts 
at both the level of the provinces and the national level. Some provinces, 
such as North Rhine-Westphalia, developed special policies to coordinate 
the crucial field of education and other areas of relevance to refugees. 
These may – in the long run – end up as typical muddling-through policies 
regarding refugees in Germany. They may also lead to a new adminis-
trative culture showing the deficits of German bureaucracy. In certain 
regions, the positive effect of migration was highlighted and refugees were 
seen as a panacea for shrinking cities and regions. In this regard, council-
lors and administrations have often used these new statistics as an argu-
ment to demand more money from the provincial level. Local finance has 
always been problematic, and for several years politicians have had to re-
ject economically important decisions to save money and to reduce func-
tions. Now, after many years, for the first time cities are growing again. 
Councillors are able to plan for infrastructural projects such as schools. 
There are three main problems. First, the shrinking regions and xenopho-
bia are more prevalent in rural than in metropolitan areas. Secondly, the 
shrinking regions are not attractive to migrants because migrants have 
special requirements. Thirdly, most migrants do not fulfil all the require-
ments and do not have the relevant skills needed by the German econ-
omy, so lengthy training and socialisation seems to be necessary. Local 
integration policies appear to be focused on muddling through, which is 
why new strategies are needed. Some of these are: 
– Substantial investment in education is necessary to ease integration. 
Education and wealth facilitates integration in German cities.
– To foster integration, it seems necessary to include the whole family as 
opposed to just the parents or just the children; hence it appears neces-
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– In the long run, it will be difficult to forbid the refugees the right to 
settle wherever they wish to in Germany, and networks within the 
refugee population may lead to a kind of internal migration within 
the country. The majority of refugees want to remain in prosperous 
regions. Here, the policy of decentralisation has to create attractive 
employment opportunities and cultural possibilities in medium-sized 
cities, which will reduce regional disparities and prevent the shrinking 
of regions and cities. In the long run, the city lights of big metropoli-
tan areas with strong cultural venues, job opportunities, and reason-
able housing can enhance the pull effects of smaller and medium-
sized cities within Germany.
– To guarantee a broad range of citizen rights and to avoid mismanage-
ment, refugees have to be included in the political process. Their in-
tegration into advisory boards could constitute the first step towards 
including them in the local political process. The differences between 
the needs of heterogeneous migrants have to be respected, while on 
the other hand, competitions between these social subgroups have to 
be avoided. Ultimately, some migrants and refugees will go back to 
their home countries, but all others should be given the opportunity 
for full inclusion into German society and full citizen rights. Paral-
lel societies with cultural enclaves must be subsumed into a vibrant, 
intercultural German society. This means building up a new cultural 
context by profiting from the ideas and influences deriving from new 
cultures. Much more bridging between different groups is required. 
This strategy seems to be much more challenging and promising than 
a mere parallel multicultural strategy. Multicultural identities have to 
be preserved and bonding is strong in most of these groups anyway, 
but bridging between societal groups can generate a more advanced 
society. 
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MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION IN GERMAN CITIES
Summary 
Germany has never regarded itself as a country of immigration. Nevertheless, 
after World War II a number of refugees settled in Germany and in the 1960s 
German industry attracted a large group of immigrants from Southern Europe 
(Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey). Both of these groups predominantly inte-
grated into German society. In the 1990s, during the Balkan wars, a large num-
ber of refugees came to Germany, but most of them returned home afterwards. In 
2015 a new migration policy emerged. Due to the war in Syria, refugees tried 
to immigrate into Central Europe via the so-called Balkan Route. They were 
partly attracted by a symbolic but brief German “open arms” policy. In 2015 
and 2016, around 1.2 million people applied for asylum in Germany. Due to 
the policy shift of the German government and new policies in Turkey and other 
countries in Eastern Europe, these numbers dropped dramatically in 2017. The 
paper tries to answer the question of who represents these refugees, as well as 
other migrants. Meanwhile, some groups with a migration background – such as 
citizens of the European Union – have full electoral rights at local and Europe-
an Union elections. Since the 1990s most other foreigners have been represented 
on advisory boards for citizens in most of the larger cities. These advisory boards 
are also regarded as advocates for refugees without a long-term perspective of 
becoming German citizens. Nevertheless, there are only three provinces (Länder) 
with an appropriate legal framework for these boards. The advisory boards are 
accepted in all 14 analysed representative cities by both the citizens and the 
councillors, although acceptance is slightly lower in Eastern compared to West-
ern Germany.
Keywords: migration, refugees, integration, Germany, political representation, 
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MIGRACIJA I INTEGRACIJA U NJEMAČKIM GRADOVIMA
Sažetak 
Njemačka sebe nikada nije smatrala državom useljenika iako se tamo nakon 
Drugoga svjetskog rata naselio veći broj izbjeglica, dok je 60-ih godina prošlo-
ga stoljeća njemačka industrija privukla veliku skupinu useljenika iz zemalja 
južne Europe (Španjolske, Italije, Grčke i Turske). Obje su se ove kategorije 
useljenika gotovo u potpunosti integrirale u njemačko društvo. Tijekom 90-ih 
godina 20. stoljeća i ratova na području Balkana opet je velik broj izbjeglica 
pristigao u Njemačku, međutim većina se poslije rata vratila kući. Nova je mi-
gracijska politika zaživjela 2015. godine. Kada su se bježeći pred ratom u Siriji 
izbjeglice nastojale preko „balkanske rute“ domoći središnje Europe, djelomično 
ih je privukla simbolična no kratkotrajna njemačka politika „raširenih ruku“. 
Otprilike 1,2 milijuna ljudi podnijelo je zahtjev za azilom u Njemačkoj 2015. 
i 2016. godine. Nakon zaokreta njemačke politike te uvođenja nove politike u 
Turskoj i državama istočne Europe te su brojke 2017. godine znatno smanjene. 
U radu se pokušava odgovoriti na pitanje tko zastupa te izbjeglice i druge mi-
grante. S druge strane, neke skupine migrantskog podrijetla kao što su primjerice 
građani Europske unije imaju sva izborna prava na lokalnim i EU izborima. 
U većim gradovima još od 90-ih godina prošlog stoljeća većinu drugih stranaca 
zastupaju savjetodavni odbori građana. Te se savjetodavne odbore također sma-
tra zagovornicima onih izbjeglica bez dugoročnih izgleda da postanu njemački 
državljani. Samo tri pokrajine (Länder) posjeduju odgovarajući zakonski okvir 
unutar kojeg savjetodavni odbori mogu djelovati. Savjetodavne odbore prihvaća-
ju i građani i vijećnici u svih 14 analiziranih reprezentativnih gradova, no u 
istočnom je dijelu Njemačke prihvaćanje slabije izraženo nego u zapadnom 
dijelu zemlje.
Ključne riječi: migracija, izbjeglice, integracija, Njemačka, zastupanje u polit-
ici, deliberativna demokracija, demokatska inovacija 
